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INTRODUCTION
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claims it is making
the community safer by targeting and removing dangerous criminal
immigrants.1 But Isaura Garcia, an immigrant living in Los
Angeles, was neither dangerous nor a criminal. In fact, all she did
was call 911 in February 2011 out of desperation to report domestic
abuse by her boyfriend.2 As is typically the case in domestic dis-
putes, the police arrested both parties and fingerprinted Isaura
according to procedure.3 Because of the Secure Communities pro-
gram, immigration officials obtained these fingerprints and flagged
Isaura, who was undocumented, for removal.4 Now the question for
Isaura’s friends and neighbors—many of whom are likely in a
similar situation—is whether it is better to endure violent abuse or
call for help and face deportation. 
Illegal immigration is one of the most prominent issues plaguing
the political and legal spheres. DHS estimates that as of January
2011, approximately 11.5 million undocumented immigrants resided
in the United States.5 Just under 60 percent arrived before January
1, 2000, and 29 percent arrived between 2000 and 2004.6 Although
government officials nationwide are quick to make their opinions
known, and to create and institute programs intended to deal with
illegal immigration, the wisdom of these programs is unclear.
Secure Communities is one such program. In 2008, DHS
created Secure Communities as a tool to focus the limited resources
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on identifying
and removing the most dangerous undocumented immigrants.7
1. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
secure_communities/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
2. Editorial, Secure Communities Program: A Flawed Deportation Tool, L.A. TIMES (May
23, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/23/opinion/la-ed-secure-20110523. 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE
UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf.
6. Id. at 3.
7. See Secure Communities, supra note 1, at “The Basics.”
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Although the program appears to be a legitimate use of limited
resources, its actual implementation has expanded far beyond the
program’s purported purpose. More importantly, the program has
had the indirect effect of undermining the U Nonimmigrant Visa (U
Visa) by discouraging immigrant interactions with law enforcement.
One of the primary purposes of the U Visa statute is to assist local
law enforcement in investigating crimes by encouraging the
cooperation of victims. Secure Communities has blurred the line be-
tween local law enforcement—whose purpose is to protect the
community—and ICE. The ultimate consequence of this blurred
distinction is that many undocumented immigrant victims, who had
been encouraged by the passage of the U Visa to report crimes and
cooperate with investigations, have a renewed fear of interacting
with the police. Although Secure Communities has made ICE’s job
easier, it has made the jobs of local law enforcement agencies,
particularly in areas with large immigrant communities, signifi-
cantly more difficult. 
Secure Communities cannot continue in its current form. DHS
created the program in a manner that extends its reach well beyond
its alleged purpose and severely disadvantages local law enforce-
ment. As implemented, this program undermines the U Visa statute
and requires modification. If the goal of Secure Communities is
truly to identify and remove serious criminals, then DHS should
reform the program to accomplish that specific goal. As it appears
DHS has no intention of doing so, this Note takes the position that
Congress should act, if for no other reason than to prevent ICE from
undermining Congress’s own legislation. 
Part I will detail the Secure Communities program and discuss
the divergence between the program’s actual implementation and
its purported purpose. Part II will describe the U Visa statute and
the reasons why Congress created it. Of particular importance will
be the relationship that the U Visa encourages between local law
enforcement and immigrant populations. Part III will analyze the
problematic interaction between Secure Communities and the U
Visa. Finally, this Note will conclude by insisting that the best
solution is to modify Secure Communities to require a conviction
before releasing an immigrant’s fingerprints. 
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I. SECURE COMMUNITIES
Drawing its authority from a 2002 congressional mandate in-
structing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to share infor-
mation with ICE,8 and from several immigration laws regarding the
deportability of criminal aliens,9 DHS initiated in 2008 an informa-
tion sharing program between the FBI and ICE.10 The program,
called Secure Communities, facilitates the identification and re-
moval of illegal aliens.11 Starting with only 14 jurisdictions, the
program has expanded to over 3000 jurisdictions.12 The eventual
goal was to expand the program nationwide.13
A. Purported Purpose
ICE receives annual appropriations from Congress that fall dras-
tically short of the amount necessary to apprehend and remove the
entire population of undocumented immigrants.14 For the 2012 fiscal
year, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations approved legis-
lation that would grant ICE approximately $5.8 billion.15 Although
this is $34 million more than the appropriation for 2011,16 it is
nowhere near the amount necessary for mass deportation. The esti-
mated cost of apprehending, legally processing, and removing the
entire undocumented population would be approximately $200
billion over five years.17 Admittedly, the government does not ap-
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) (2006).
9. See id. § 1226(c)-(d) (discussing the identification and detention of criminal aliens); id.
§ 1227(a)(2) (designating criminal aliens as deportable); id. § 1228(a)(3) (instructing the
expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing aggravated felonies).
10. See Secure Communities, supra note 1.
11. See id.
12. Id. at “The Basics.”
13. Id. 
14. See id. 
15. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Summary: Fiscal Year 2012
Homeland Security Appropriations 5 (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://appropriations.
senate.gov/news.cfm?method=news.view&id=657ba3e6-b6da-46e3-80f3-4865726d8889.
16. Id.
17. MARSHALL FITZ ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE COSTS OF MASS DEPORTATION:
IMPRACTICAL, EXPENSIVE, AND INEFFECTIVE, at i (2010), available at http://www.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/03/pdf/cost_of_deportation.pdf.
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portion all of these duties to ICE, but even the cost of apprehension
and detention—the tasks of ICE—would be approximately $187
billion.18
Because of its limited resources, ICE purports to prioritize the
removal of criminals and those that pose a threat to public safety.19
ICE created Secure Communities in order to carry out this prioritiz-
ation.20 Its three main objectives are to
(1) identify aliens in federal, state, and local custody charged
with or convicted of serious criminal offenses who are subject to
removal and at large aliens convicted of a serious criminal
offense who are subject to removal; (2) prioritize enforcement
actions to ensure apprehension and removal of aliens convicted
of serious criminal offenses; and (3) transform criminal alien
enforcement processes and systems to achieve lasting results.21
B. The Procedure
Secure Communities makes use of an already-existing frame-
work of information sharing between local law enforcement and
the federal government. After fingerprinting individuals booked
into county and city jails, local jurisdictions have traditionally
released the fingerprints to the FBI to check the individuals’ crim-
inal records.22 Under Secure Communities, the FBI automatically
sends the fingerprints to ICE.23 ICE checks the fingerprints against
its immigration databases to see if the individuals are unlawfully in
the United States or if they are otherwise removable based on a
criminal conviction.24
In order to prioritize the removal of serious criminals, Secure
Communities identifies criminal charges as fitting into one of three
18. Id.
19. See Secure Communities, supra note 1. 
20. Id.
21. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES 3 [hereinafter STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES], available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf.
22. See Secure Communities, supra note 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. Even aliens who are lawfully in the United States are deportable if they are
convicted of certain types of crimes. See 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2006).
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levels, based on the severity of the crime.25 Level 1 offenses are the
most serious. Secure Communities purports to prioritize only the
removal of aliens with Level 1 charges or convictions.26 This cate-
gory includes national security violations, homicide, sexual assault
and other sex offenses, hit-and-run offenses involving injury or
death, robbery, aggravated assault, resisting an officer, cruelty to-
ward child or spouse, and drug offenses carrying a sentence of over
a year.27
Although the program does not prioritize lesser offenses, it none-
theless classifies them for identification purposes into either Level
2 or Level 3. Level 2 offenses are largely property crimes and in-
clude arson, burglary, larceny, fraud, smuggling, embezzlement, and
traffic offenses.28 All other offenses, primarily misdemeanors, are
Level 3, including gambling, extortion, property damage, bribery,
violations of election laws, public order crimes, and obstructing the
police.29 Secure Communities classifies immigration offenses as
Level 3.30
Because the FBI automatically releases information to ICE, local
jurisdictions play no part in the process until ICE targets an
immigrant for removal. ICE will issue an Immigration Detainer to
the local law enforcement office that booked the immigrant.31 If the
jurisdiction has already released the alien before ICE issues the
detainer, law enforcement should provide ICE with information
relating to the individual’s identification and location.32
Local law enforcement cooperation is essential to Secure
Communities. After receiving a detainer order, the local law enforce-
ment office must hold the immigrant for up to forty-eight hours,
excluding weekends and holidays, to allow ICE to retrieve the
alien.33 After forty-eight hours, the detainer automatically expires,
and if ICE does not take custody of the immigrant, the law requires
25. See STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 21, at 9.
26. See id. at 5 (“When ICE determines an alien has been charged or convicted of a Level
1 offense that could result in removal ... ICE will file an Immigration Detainer.”).
27. Id. at 5, 9.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 9.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. 
33. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012).
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that law enforcement release the alien.34 Failure to do so subjects
the agency to a potential civil rights suit for violation of the immi-
grant’s due process rights.35 DHS also instructs law enforcement
agencies to allow ICE agents access to detainees to conduct inter-
views and serve documents, as well as to assist ICE in acquiring
information about the immigrant.36 Even beyond procedural involve-
ment, DHS encourages law enforcement offices to promote Secure
Communities by including it in community policing and by dissemi-
nating information about the program.37
C. Reality and Controversy
On paper, Secure Communities appears to limit detention efforts
to the most serious offenders. Likewise, ICE claims to prioritize the
removal of “individuals who present the most significant threats to
public safety” based on criminal history and the severity of their
crime.38 
The data, however, tells a different story. Since the creation of the
program in October 2008, ICE has removed approximately 220,322
aliens from the United States based on the fingerprint submissions
it has received through the Secure Communities program.39 Only
61,348 of those were charged with or convicted of Level 1 crimes.40
Of the remaining 158,974 aliens removed, 54,258 were noncriminals
34. See id.
35. See Rivas v. Martin, 781 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (finding that the
plaintiff “ha[d] pleaded sufficient allegations of prolonged detention in violation of her right
to due process”); see also Immigrants Challenge Use of Detainers, LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE
NEWSL. (Am. Immigrant Law Found. Legal Action Ctr., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2, 2009, at
1, 2, available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/litclr_newsletter_
100209.pdf (discussing a case in which a deported immigrant reached a settlement with the
City of New York for unlawfully detaining him past forty-eight hours on two separate
occasions).
36. See STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 21, at 6.
37. Id.
38. See Secure Communities, supra note 1.
39. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES IDENT/IAFIS
INTEROPERABILITY STATISTICS: MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2012, at 2 (2012)
[hereinafter ICE STATISTICS], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_
interop_stats-fy2012-to-date.pdf.
40. Id.
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—they were not charged with or convicted of either Level 1, Level 2,
or Level 3 crimes.41 
These results are even more disturbing when observed on a
county-by-county basis. The percent of noncriminals removed
through Secure Communities is strikingly high in certain counties.
For example, since DHS implemented the program in Jefferson
Parish, Louisiana, in November 2009,42 67 percent of aliens removed
have been noncriminals.43 In Prince George’s County, Maryland,
just outside the District of Columbia, the percentage of noncriminal
removals is as high as 60 percent.44 With a larger number of total
immigrant deportations than either of the former, Miami-Dade,
Florida registers 47 percent noncriminal removals.45 Of the 11,774
immigrants deported from Los Angeles County between August
2009 and January 2011, nearly half were either noncriminals or
had committed only misdemeanors.46 The American Immigration
Lawyers Association (AILA) recently released a report documenting
127 cases from twenty-four states in which police detained im-
migrants for minor offenses and those immigrants ended up in
removal proceedings.47 In forty-one of those cases, local law enforce-
ment never pursued any charges against the immigrants.48 
With data like this, it is little wonder that, since its implementa-
tion, Secure Communities has been the subject of significant con-
troversy. Law enforcement, members of Congress, crime victim
advocates, and community leaders have criticized the program for
greatly exceeding its stated goal of targeting dangerous criminals.49
41. Id. 
42. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS 9 (2012)
[hereinafter ICE JURISDICTIONS], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/
pdf/sc-activated2.pdf.
43. ICE STATISTICS, supra note 39, at 22. 
44. Id. at 23.
45. Id. at 12. Other notable examples include Webb County, Texas (48 percent), Palm
Beach (53 percent), Orange County (49 percent), and Broward County, Florida (50 percent).
Id. at 11, 12, 47.
46. Editorial, supra note 2. 
47. AM. IMMIGRATION  LAWYERS ASS’N, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OFF TARGET: MINOR
OFFENSES WITH MAJOR CONSEQUENCES 3 (2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/
fileviewer.aspx?docid=36646&linkid=236762.
48. See id. at 5-7.
49. See AM.’S VOICE EDUC. FUND, PUBLIC SAFETY ON ICE: HOW DO YOU POLICE A
COMMUNITY THAT WON’T TALK TO YOU? 1 (2011), http://amvoice.3cdn.net/73093e2eeae748
d60d_bdm6iy3u2.pdf. 
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Police in cities with large immigrant populations are concerned by
stories of ICE targeting victims and other noncriminals for removal,
and they fear that the program will deter immigrants from report-
ing crimes or providing useful information.50 Chief of Police Brian
Kyes of Chelsea, Massachusetts, for example, believes that Secure
Communities has created “mistrust of local police, discouraged
people from reporting crime, and made everyone more vulnerable to
crime by breaking down hard earned relationships.”51
Despite the controversy, Secure Communities has continued to
expand. DHS launched the program in 2008 with only fourteen
active jurisdictions.52 Since then, the number of active Secure
Communities jurisdictions has expanded exponentially. Generally,
Secure Communities jurisdictions are congruent with local police
jurisdictions and normally represent a specific county within a
state. As of January 22, 2013, DHS reached nationwide activation
of all U.S. jurisdictions under the Secure Communities program,53
meaning that all 3181 U.S. jurisdictions are currently active.54 
Once thought to be voluntary, Secure Communities appears now
to be a mandatory program. ICE recently declared that, despite
some confusion based on its prior statements, state and local juris-
dictions cannot now, nor could they ever, opt out of the program.55
Local jurisdictions can choose not to receive the identifications that
result from the processing of the fingerprints through ICE’s system,
but this has no effect on whether the local ICE office will take
enforcement action based on those results.56 Secure Communities
can, and will, continue to function regardless of any disapproval by
the states or the public.
50. Editorial, supra note 2. 
51. Press Release, ACLU of Mass., Gov. Patrick Rejects Federal Deportation Program in
Massachusetts (June 6, 2011), available at http://aclum.org/news_6.6.11.
52. Secure Communities, supra note 1, at “The Basics.” 
53. ICE JURISDICTIONS, supra note 42.
54. Id.
55. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); see also
infra Part III.C.
56. Secure Communities, supra note 1.
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II. THE U VISA
Like Secure Communities, the U Visa is an immigration program
aimed at promoting public safety, but it uses a very different ap-
proach. The U Visa57 is a form of temporary legal status granted to
qualifying immigrant victims of crime.58 Congress created this visa
through the passage of the Battered Immigrant Women Protection
Act (BIWPA) as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA).59 Six years earlier, Congress had
passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),60 which
granted abused spouses of U.S. citizens or permanent residents an
avenue to obtain immigration benefits without having to rely on
their abusive spouse.61 In 2000, however, Congress recognized the
57. Its name comes from the corresponding section of the United States Code. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U) (2006).
58. See Tahja L. Jensen, U Visa “Certification”: Overcoming the Local Hurdle in Response
to a Federal Statute, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 691, 691-92 & n.2 (2009); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U) (enumerating the qualifications immigrant crime victims must meet to gain
temporary legal status). This temporary status is not exclusively available to undocumented
immigrants. See id. (noting that an “alien” who meets the qualifications can file a petition for
status); see also id. § 1101(a)(3) (defining “alien” as anyone who is not a citizen or national,
regardless of her immigration status). The temporary nature of the legal status provided by
the U Visa, however, makes it of no benefit to immigrants who already have permanent
residency. See id. § 1101(a)(20). Because U Visas have the possibility of leading to legal
permanent residency, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 1513(a)(2)(C), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534 (2000), it is conceivable that an alien with some other
form of temporary legal status may seek out a U Visa in an effort to extend his or her stay.
The most likely beneficiary of the U Visa, however, remains an individual who does not
currently have legal status. 
59. §§ 1501-1513, 114 Stat. at 1518-37 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 27 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C.). Though Congress
passed this Act in 2000, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) did not
issue regulations for the U Visa until 2007. New Classification for Victims of Criminal
Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014 (Sept. 17, 2007)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a, and 299). It was not until October 17, 2007
that USCIS began adjudicating U Visa petitions. See USCIS Update: U Nonimmigrant
Interim Relief Recipients Reminded to Apply for U Visa, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/news (navigate to “December 2009”; then follow “USCIS
Update: U Nonimmigrant Interim Relief Recipients Reminded to Apply for U Visa” hyperlink)
(last updated Dec. 14, 2009).
60. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
61. Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for Approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
Self-Petitioners, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/
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limitations of VAWA and sought to pass legislation that would have
a broader effect.62 Recognizing that immigrants were particularly
vulnerable to violent-crime victimization,63 Congress asserted that
all victims should be able to report crimes and participate fully in
the investigation and prosecution of those crimes without fear of
deportation.64 In an effort both to protect victims and to encourage
reporting of crimes, BIWPA created a new nonimmigrant visa
classification that gave immigrant victims of crime the possibility
of acquiring legal status if they cooperate with the criminal inves-
tigation.65 
Although federal law incorporates a long list of qualifying crimes
that create U Visa eligibility for victims,66 Congress sought specifi-
cally to address concerns about domestic violence.67 A closer look at
the list of qualifying crimes reveals that the majority are crimes
often associated with domestic violence, including rape and sexual
assault.68 Although not exclusively used for domestic violence vic-
tims, the U Visa is one of the most valuable assets immigrant do-
mestic violence victims have.69
news (navigate to “April 2008”; then follow “Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance For Approved
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-Petitioners” hyperlink) (last updated Nov. 14,
2011).
62. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1502(a)(3) (“[T]here are several
groups of battered immigrant women and children who do not have access to the immigration
protections of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 which means that their abusers are
virtually immune from prosecution because their victims can be deported as a result of action
by their abusers.”).
63. Id. § 1513(a)(1)(A).
64. Id. §§ 1502(a)(2), 1513(a)(1)(B).
65. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(A)-(B).
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (2006).
67. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1502(b)(2) (stating that one
of the purposes of the Act was “to offer protection against domestic violence occurring in
family and intimate relationships”).
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii).
69. Although U Visas can be obtained for victims of other qualifying crimes, advocates
most often pursue them for victims of domestic violence. Compare, e.g., Lauren Smiley, U-
Visa: Illegal Immigrants Become Legal Residents via Crime Victimization, SFWEEKLY (Mar.
16, 2011), http://www.sfweekly.com/2011-03-16/news/u-1-visa-illegal-immigrant-crime-victim-
lauren-smiley/ (telling the story of an immigrant receiving a U Visa after he was robbed at
gunpoint), with BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, ASSISTING IMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: ADVOCATE’S GUIDE 6-7, available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/
documents/assistingimmigrantdv/assistingimmigrantdv.pdf (discussing U Visas as an option
for domestic violence victims). 
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A. Dual Purpose 
When Congress passed BIWPA, it made its intent perfectly clear: 
The purpose of this section is to create a new nonimmigrant visa
classification that will strengthen the ability of law enforcement
agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic
violence, sexual assault, trafficking of aliens, and other crimes
... committed against aliens, while offering protection to victims
of such offenses in keeping with the humanitarian interest of the
United States.70 
Congress believed that “[t]his visa [would] encourage law enforce-
ment officials to better serve immigrant [communities] and to
prosecute crimes committed against aliens.”71 
Congress recognized the unique circumstances of immigrant vic-
tims of crime and the important concerns they face when attempting
to report violence.72 Undocumented immigrants live most of their
lives in constant fear of deportation and are thus placed in the
unique situation of feeling unable to use society’s resources—
particularly law enforcement—to protect themselves from acts of
violence.73 With many immigrant victims of violence unable to ob-
tain the immigration protections of VAWA,74 Congress created this
new broadly applicable nonimmigrant visa. Its goal was the pro-
tection of “certain crime victims including victims of crimes against
women,”75 regardless of their immigration status or that of the
perpetrator. 
Beyond merely protecting victims, Congress wanted to strengthen
the ability of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute crimes.76
Immigrant victims are often silenced by their fear of deportation,
their distrust of law enforcement, and their misunderstanding of the
70. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1513(a)(2)(A).
71. Id.
72. See id. § 1502(a)(2).
73. See Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual Purposes of the U Visa Thwarted in a Legislative Duel,
29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 373, 379 (2010). 
74. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1502(a)(3).
75. Id. § 1513.
76. Id. § 1513(a)(2)(A).
2013] SECURE COMMUNITIES 2067
criminal justice system.77 Congress hoped that “[c]reating a new
nonimmigrant visa classification [would] facilitate the reporting of
crimes to law enforcement officials by ... victimized ... aliens who are
not in lawful immigration status.”78 
B. Elements the Victim Must Show
In order to obtain a U Visa, an immigrant needs to prove (1) that
she was a victim of a qualifying crime that occurred in the United
States or its territories; (2) that she possesses information about the
crime; (3) that she has been or will be helpful in the investigation;
and (4) that she suffered substantially as a result of the crime.79
Only victims of certain crimes, however, qualify for legal status.
Qualifying crimes include, but are not limited to “rape; torture;
trafficking; incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual
contact; prostitution; [or] sexual exploitation.”80 In addition to these
specifically mentioned crimes, the statute also includes attempts
and conspiracies to commit a qualifying crime and allows for juris-
dictional differences in criminal definitions.81
As mentioned, one of the dual purposes of the U Visa is to pro-
mote public safety by encouraging cooperation with law enforce-
ment.82 Setting aside the humanitarian interest the government
has in protecting victims of crime, extending the possibility of legal
77. See Abrams, supra note 73, at 379. Distrust of the justice system may have little to
do with immigrants’ experiences in the United States and may stem from encounters with
police in their home country. Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 77 (2009)
[hereinafter Immigration Hearing] (statement of Professor David A. Harris, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-
19_48439.pdf. 
78. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 1513(a)(2)(B).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) (2006); Alien Victims of Certain Qualifying Criminal
Activity, 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b) (2012).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). Additional qualifying crimes include “female genital
mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; kidnapping;
abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion;
manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; [or]
perjury.” Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra Part II.A.
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status to victims has the practical effect of eliminating one possible
deterrent to cooperating with police and ultimately leads to a
greater likelihood that the police will apprehend the perpetrator. In
order to be of assistance to the police, the victim must have bene-
ficial information about the crime. Thus, the second requirement for
a U Visa is that the immigrant must “possess[] credible and reliable
information establishing that he or she has knowledge of the details
concerning the qualifying criminal activity upon which his or her
petition is based.”83 These specific facts about the crime must be
sufficient to cause law enforcement to determine that the immigrant
has or will provide assistance in the investigation.84
In conjunction with possessing information, the immigrant must
be willing to use that information in order to assist with the in-
vestigation or prosecution of the crime. The alien is required to
prove that she “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be
helpful.”85 Although an immigrant can attempt to show helpfulness
through her required personal statement,86 the most important
piece of evidence is a signed law enforcement certification. As part
of her U Visa petition, every applicant must submit a Form I-918,
Supplement B, “U Nonimmigrant Status Certification.” This form
is often referred to as the “law enforcement certification” and must
be signed by a certifying official from a certifying agency stating
that the immigrant was a victim of a qualifying crime and that she
was helpful.87 
C. The Problem of Law Enforcement Certifications
Since the enactment of the U Visa statute, one of the largest
hurdles for immigrants to overcome has been obtaining the law
enforcement certification.88 Although submitting this certification
is a requirement for consideration for the U Visa, “an agency’s
83. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(2).
84. Id.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(3).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(iii).
87. Id. § 214.14(c)(2)(i).
88. See Jensen, supra note 58, at 700-04 (describing the U Visa certification hurdle and
reasons for it).
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decision to provide a certification is entirely discretionary.”89 In
addition to the logistical difficulties encountered by immigrants and
legal advocates,90 even more prevalent is the ignorance and reluc-
tance of law enforcement officials to sign U Visa certifications.91 One
common misunderstanding among potential certifiers is that
signing a U Visa certification is essentially granting an immigrant
legal status.92 This is not the case. The law enforcement certification
is simply a fact-based determination that the immigrant was a vic-
tim of a qualifying crime and that she has been helpful in the
investigation.93 The certifying official does not make the final de-
cision as to whether an immigrant will receive a U Visa.
Another potential barrier is the reluctance to certify immigrants
who are currently in removal proceedings,94 under the belief that
those individuals would be ineligible to receive a U Visa. Ultimately,
because the law enforcement certification is only a fact-based deter-
mination of helpfulness, an immigrant’s removal status should be
of no concern to the certifying official, as he or she does not make
the ultimate eligibility decision. Although illegal entry into the
United States and illegal presence are both grounds for inadmissi-
bility under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and both would
thus prevent an immigrant from obtaining a visa,95 a U Visa ap-
plicant can apply for a waiver to set aside her inadmissibility
89. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-918, SUPPLEMENT B, U
NONIMMIGRANT STATUS CERTIFICATION 1 [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-918], available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-918supbinstr.pdf.
90. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Mandatory U-Visa Certification Unnecessarily Undermines
the Purpose of the Violence Against Women Act’s Immigration Protections and Its “Any
Credible Evidence” Rules—A Call for Consistency, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619, 637 (2010)
(noting that many enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices have failed to designate an
official from the agency to sign U Visa certifications).
91. See Jensen, supra note 58, at 701, 704-07.
92. See Sejal Zota, Law Enforcement’s Role in U Visa Certification, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T
IMMIGR. L. BULL., June 2009, at 1, 5, available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/
pdfs/ilb02.pdf (responding to this concern).
93. See INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-918, supra note 89, at 1.
94. SAMEERA HAFIZ ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRANT VICTIMS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE P’SHIP, TOOL KIT
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF THE U-VISA 43 (2010), available at http://www.acasa.
us/pdfs/U-Visa-Toolkit%20%20FINAL.pdf (responding to this concern and clarifying continued
eligibility).
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (2006).
2070 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:2055
grounds.96 In fact, many immigrants with final orders of removal
have applied for and obtained U Visas.97
Because of the difficulties faced with U Visa certifications, legal
advocates have expended substantial effort to educate law enforce-
ment and garner support for this avenue to legal status for immi-
grants.98 Whatever strides they may have made through their
efforts, however, have been undercut by Secure Communities, which
makes law enforcement officers the adversaries of undocumented
immigrants.
III. SECURE COMMUNITIES UNDERMINES THE U VISA
Congress created the U Visa with two important goals in mind: to
protect victims of crime and to strengthen law enforcement efforts.99
Because of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS)
delay in implementing the U Visa,100 proponents of the U Visa had
only about a year to convince the immigrant population that
cooperating with the police was safe and beneficial before Secure
Communities undermined their efforts. Although the purported
intent of Secure Communities is not in opposition to the U Visa, its
implementation is. Not only do its large-scale deportation schemes
perpetuate fear throughout immigrant communities, but its use of
local law enforcement as a deportation tool makes futile any
attempt to convince immigrants that cooperation is safe. 
96. Id. § 1182(d)(14) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall determine whether a
ground of inadmissibility exists with respect to a nonimmigrant [U Visa applicant]. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Attorney General’s discretion, may waive
[inadmissibility grounds] if the Secretary of Homeland Security considers it to be in the public
or national interest to do so.”).
97. See Anna Gorman, A Race Between Protection and Deportation, L.A. TIMES (July 13,
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/13/local/me-u-visa13.
98. See, e.g., HAFIZ ET AL., supra note 94; Stacey Ivie & Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa: An
Effective Resource for Law Enforcement, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 2009, at 1, 10,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2009-
pdfs/october2009.pdf. 
99. See supra Part II.A.
100. See supra note 59.
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A. Secure Communities Creates a Chilling Effect
The goal of law enforcement is to protect the community. To do so,
it relies heavily on the cooperation of the public. Imagine a commu-
nity with rampant crime but no victims or witnesses willing to
report those crimes or cooperate with law enforcement. In this
scenario, criminals would be free to commit crimes with little fear
of repercussion. The most disturbing part of that scenario is that it
is not far from reality in many immigrant communities where “[t]he
fear of deportation has created a class of silent victims and under-
mined officers’ attempts at community-oriented policing among
immigrant populations.”101 Community policing emphasizes collab-
oration between law enforcement and the community to develop
solutions to problems and increase trust in police.102 Trust and
collaboration cannot occur if members of the community believe that
any interaction with police will lead to their deportation. If victims
do not report crimes, then law enforcement officials cannot do their
jobs effectively.
One of the purposes of the U Visa was to strengthen the ability of
law enforcement to apprehend perpetrators by encouraging immi-
grant victims to cooperate in investigations.103 Secure Communities
has thwarted that purpose by blurring the distinction between local
law enforcement and ICE officials. ICE may require local police who
arrest an immigrant but decide not to charge him or her to detain
the individual anyway for as long as five days.104 Not only would the
police be detaining the individual for immigration reasons but ICE
officials would also question the individual regarding the immigra-
tion matter at the police station.105 From the perspective of the
immigrants, their interactions with the local police would ultimately
result in their placement in removal proceedings. This is especially
101. Ivie & Nanasi, supra note 98, at 10.
102. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY
POLICING DEFINED 5 (2012), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e030917193-
CP-Defined.pdf.
103. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
104. By issuing an Immigration Detainer, ICE can require law enforcement to detain an
immigrant for up to forty-eight hours. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2012). However, if it were a
holiday weekend, the immigrant would be detained for five days.
105. Secure Communities requires local law enforcement to open up their facility to ICE
for interviewing immigrants. See STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 21, at 6.
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true if the immigrant is transitioned directly from police custody to
ICE custody, but it is also the case even when ICE detention occurs
after the police have released the immigrant.
News of deportation spreads quickly through immigrant commu-
nities, and “when one victim or witness is deported ... fear prolifer-
ates.”106 It is easy to see the harm this causes law enforcement.
When immigrants associate the police with deportation, they begin
to fear any interaction with them. As one expert testified before
Congress in 2009, “They will fear that any encounter with the police
—reporting a crime, telling a police officer about dangerous persons
or events in the community, or even telling an officer that they
themselves have become crime victims—will result in investigation
of them, and will focus on their immigration status.”107
This will have an effect not only on undocumented immigrants
but also on citizens and immigrants that have legal status.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, approximately 3.2 million
American citizens live in households in which some people have
legal status and others do not.108 If they believe that interactions
with the police will bring immigration consequences on a household
member, even individuals with legal status may refuse to cooperate
with the police.109 This chilling effect created by Secure Communi-
ties makes opponents worry that it may be causing more harm than
good. Ultimately, “[t]he heart of concern is that the program, con-
ceived of as a method of targeting those who pose the greatest
threat to our communities, is in fact having the opposite effect and
compromising public safety by deterring witnesses to crime and
others from working with law enforcement.”110 When immigrants
lose trust in the police because of their involvement with ICE, crime
actually increases because residents stop cooperating and criminals
remain at large.111 Law enforcement is unable to promote public
106. AM.’S VOICE EDUC. FUND, supra note 49, at 4. 
107. Immigration Hearing, supra note 77, at 77.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Letter from Mylan L. Denerstein, Counsel to Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of N.Y., to
John Sandweg, Counselor to the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011)
[hereinafter N.Y. Letter], available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20
Communities.pdf.
111. See ROBERT KOULISH, IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: SUBVERTING THE
RULE OF LAW 137 (2010).
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safety effectively if an entire subset of the community is unwilling
to cooperate: “How do we police a community that won’t talk to
us?”112
B. Secure Communities Harms Victims
One of the key motivations behind the U Visa legislation was a
desire to protect victims of crime, particularly victims of domestic
violence.113 The only way to do so is to arrest and prosecute the
perpetrators. This is particularly difficult with domestic violence
because victims already report only about half of all domestic
violence crimes that occur in the United States.114 The rates are
even lower when the victim is an immigrant. Lawful permanent
residents report domestic violence only 43.1 percent of the time, and
the rate drops to 20.8 percent for those with temporary legal status
and 18.8 percent for those who are undocumented.115 Congress
created the U Visa to try to improve those statistics.116 
The proponents of Secure Communities would argue that the
program has no effect on the goal of the U Visa because it applies to
only those individuals who law enforcement officials have arrested,
not to victims.117 The problem with this reasoning is that it ignores
the reality of domestic violence cases: police often arrest either both
parties or the wrong party.118 If all that is necessary for ICE to run
a person through the Secure Communities database is an arrest,
then it makes no difference that the individual was in fact the
victim rather than the abuser: “[O]fficers arrest victims of domestic
112. Leah Rae, Police Foundation Looks at Immigration Role for Local Cops: ‘Why and Why
Not?’, BEYOND BORDERS, LOHUD (Aug. 19, 2008, 3:34 PM), http://immigration.lohudblogs.
com/2008/08/19/police-foundation-looks-at-immigration-role-for-local-cops-why-and-why-not/
(quoting Ron Miller, chief of police for Topeka, Kansas).
113. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
114. See AM.’S VOICE EDUC. FUND, supra note 49, at 6.
115. Nawal H. Ammar et al., Calls to Police and Police Response: A Case Study of Latina
Immigrant Women in the USA, 7 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 230, 236 (2005). 
116. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
117. See supra Part I.B.
118. See Editorial, supra note 2; Shankar Vedantam, No Opt-Out for Immigration
Enforcement, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/09/30/AR2010093007268.html; Jordan Helton, New Immigration Law in
Washington Has Anti-Violence Groups Worried, MEDILL ON THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/390/news.aspx?id=160341.
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violence along with their abusers only to later release them without
charge .... Secure Communities will therefore result in undocu-
mented victims of domestic violence being deported.”119 Not only
does Secure Communities deter victims from reporting crimes,120
leaving them with few options but to attempt to escape the abuse on
their own, it also punishes the few victims who do report their
abusers by placing them in removal proceedings as well.
Admittedly, DHS did not intend Secure Communities to affect the
willingness of victims and witnesses to cooperate with the police.
Recognizing that victims and witnesses were inadvertently ending
up within the system, ICE’s director issued a memo reminding field
officers to “exercise all appropriate discretion on a case-by-case basis
when making detention and enforcement decisions in the case of
victims of crime, witnesses to crime, and individuals pursuing legit-
imate civil rights complaints.”121 Although the memo encourages
prosecutorial discretion, it provides no remedy if individual agents
do not adhere or make a mistake regarding the immigrants status
as a victim or witness122: “These guidelines and priorities are not
intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.”123 Simply
encouraging prosecutorial discretion does not provide a sufficient
safeguard.
The only possible way Secure Communities could exist alongside
the U Visa and not undermine it completely would be to prevent the
removal of victims without serious convictions. However, as the law
stands now, ICE’s power is unchecked even by the judicial system:
119. Helton, supra note 118.
120. See supra Part III.A.
121. Memorandum on Prosecutorial Discretion from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion],
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
122. In fact, the overall effectiveness of this memo is doubtful. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASS’N, HOLDING DHS ACCOUNTABLE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 4 (2011),
available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=37615 (reporting that most ICE
offices have not changed their practices, even after directed to exercise prosecutorial
discretion).
123. Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 121, at 3. Whereas the memo advocates
the idea that prosecutorial discretion cannot be subject to review, some have rejected this
notion in other contexts. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840-55 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (rejecting the “presumption of unreviewability” of agency decisions). 
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“No court may set aside any action or decision ... regarding the
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial
of bond or parole.”124 ICE retains discretion over who is placed in
removal proceedings, and as the evidence shows,125 it has not ad-
hered to the ultimate purpose of Secure Communities—identifying
and removing the most serious criminals. Nothing holds ICE to its
claim that it will not target victims and witnesses.
C. Opt-Out Controversy
One of the biggest controversies behind the Secure Communities
program has been the question of opting out. Many initially believed
that the program was optional and that jurisdictions could opt out
of participation.126 Throughout the early stages of the program, ICE
entered into memoranda of agreement with the participating
states.127 These memoranda detailed Secure Communities’ proce-
dure and laid out the responsibilities of each agency.128 The mem-
oranda also included a clause about termination, stating that either
party could choose to terminate the agreements at any time.129
Additional ICE reports also gave jurisdictions detailed instructions
for opting out of the program or delaying their activation date.130 For
example,
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2006).
125. See supra Part I.C; note 122.
126. See Elise Foley, Opting Out of Immigration Enforcement, WASH. INDEP. (Sept. 1, 2010,
4:12 PM), http://washingtonindependent.com/96472/opting-out-of-immigration-enforcement
[hereinafter Foley, Opting Out] (noting opt-out procedure); Elise Foley, Rep. Zoe Lofgren to
DHS: Secure Communities Investigation Should Start Now, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2011,
6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/18/zoe-lofgren-secure-communities-
investigation_n_863915.html; David Rice, “Secure Communities” Program No Longer
Voluntary, SAN DIEGO READER (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.sandiegoreader.com/weblogs/news-
ticker/2011/aug/09/secure-communities-program-no-longer-voluntary/; see also David
Sherfinski, Secure Communities Program Confusing to FBI, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/10/secure-communities-program-confusing-
to-fbi/?page=all (discussing the confusion due to mixed messages regarding opt out).
127. See Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement and [State Identification Bureau], available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf.
128. Id. at 1-4.
129. Id. at 4-5.
130. See Foley, Opting Out, supra note 126; see also Memorandum to Sarah Regarding “Opt
Out,” ICE FOIA 10-2674.0003146, http://uncoverthetruth.org/featured/opt-out-documents-re-
produced (follow “ICE Documents” hyperlink and download documents).
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If a jurisdiction does not wish to activate on its scheduled date
in the Secure Communities deployment plan, it must formally
notify its state identification bureau and ICE in writing (email,
letter or facsimile). Upon receipt of that information, ICE will
request a meeting with federal partners, the jurisdiction, and
the state to discuss any issues and come to a resolution, which
may include adjusting the jurisdiction’s activation date in or
removing the jurisdiction from the deployment plan.131
When several states and jurisdictions attempted to terminate the
agreements and opt out of the program, ICE changed its original
position and told these jurisdictions that despite earlier reports and
correspondence, the program was mandatory.132 ICE explained that
because the program relies on information sharing between the FBI
and ICE, the only way to opt out was to stop sending fingerprints to
the FBI.133 Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano now in-
sists that “[t]his whole opt-in, opt-out thing was a misunderstanding
from the get-go.”134
Controversy over ICE’s mixed messages and the current status of
the opt-out option ultimately led several immigrant advocacy groups
to file a Freedom of Information Act request with ICE regarding
Secure Communities.135 After ICE withheld certain records regard-
ing opt out, claiming a FOIA exemption, the groups sought to com-
pel their release, asserting that ICE had “intentionally concealed its
plans for the implementation of Secure Communities, leaving the
public in the dark.”136 The court-ordered released documents do in
fact show a distinct change in stance within ICE on whether the
program was mandatory.137 Some internal DHS e-mails even give
131. Foley, Opting Out, supra note 126.
132. Vedantam, supra note 118. 
133. Id.
134. Carla Marinucci, Janet Napolitano Clarifies Immigration Program, S.F. CHRON. (Apr.
26, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Janet-Napolitano-clarifies-immigration-
program-2374118.php.
135. Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency,
811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
136. Id. at 731.
137. Compare, e.g., E-mail Chain Within Enforcement Law Div., ICE, Re: SC question, ICE
FOIA 10-2674.0002022 (July 29-30, 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/featured/
opt-out-documents-re-produced (follow “ICE Documents” hyperlink and download documents)
(stating that Secure Communities is a voluntary program), with Mandatory Interoperability
Definition Talking Points, ICE FOIA 10-2674.0002417, available at http://uncoverthetruth.
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the impression that the program was voluntary until some jurisdic-
tions refused to participate, at which point it became mandatory.138
Despite reports that the program is now mandatory, several
states and jurisdictions have nonetheless attempted to opt out.139
For example, in a letter from the New York Governor’s Office to
DHS, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo’s counsel declared,
[U]ntil the numerous questions and controversies regarding
[Secure Communities] can be resolved, we have determined that
New York is best served by relying on existing tools ... especially
given our overriding concern that the current mechanism is
actually underming [sic] law enforcement. As a result, we are
suspending New York’s participation in this program.140
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn also sent a similar letter terminating
the state’s Memorandum of Agreement with ICE based on informa-
tion that less than 20 percent of the immigrants deported from
Illinois under Secure Communities had serious criminal convic-
tions.141 Massachusetts, Washington State, Pennsylvania, and the
District of Columbia, have also refused further participation in the
program.142 Remaining undeterred by the controversy, ICE informed
the governors of the thirty-nine states that had signed memoranda
of agreement that it did not need the states’ approval to continue
operating Secure Communities in their states and said it was
voiding the earlier signed agreements.143
org/featured/opt-out-documents-re-produced (follow “ICE Documents” hyperlink and download
documents) (noting that the program “does not require the consent of [local law enforcement
agents]”).
138. See Mallie Jane Kim, Controversial Immigration Program Spurs Federal-State Spat,
U.S. NEWS (June 27, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/06/27/controversial-
immigration-program-spurs-federal-state-spat (“The [Secure Communities] initiative will
remain voluntary at both the State and Local level.... Until such time as localities begin to
push back on participation, we will continue with this current line of thinking.” (quoting
internal DHS e-mail produced in response to FOIA request)).
139. See id. (discussing how California may join several other states in opting out).
140. N.Y. Letter, supra note 110.
141. Letter from Pat Quinn, Governor of Ill., to Marc Rapp, Acting Assistant Dir. of Secure
Communities, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (May 4, 2011), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/2011-05ilterminate.pdf.
142. Kim, supra note 138.
143. Brian Bennett, States Can’t Opt Out of Secure Communities Program, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/06/nation/la-na-secure-communities-
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IV. SECURE COMMUNITIES MUST BE REFORMED
Secure Communities undercuts federal law and cannot continue
in its current form. Although purporting to make communities safer,
it has actually perpetuated fear and undermined the work of local
law enforcement.144 Rather than using the program to help prioritize
its limited resources, ICE has used Secure Communities to initiate
a mass deportation scheme at the expense of community security
and law enforcement nationwide.145 Although ICE does not have the
resources to fully finance a scheme of this magnitude,146 through
Secure Communities it is able to use local jurisdictions to do much
of the legwork in locating and initially detaining aliens. By saving
money in one area, it can remove more aliens using fewer re-
sources.147 The problem is that Secure Communities has placed
significant burdens on local jurisdictions in the name of protecting
against the most serious criminals but has in reality removed
immigrants indiscriminately.148 ICE has essentially chosen quantity
over quality and sacrificed other interests to its goal of mass
deportation. 
Admittedly, many law enforcement officials do not consider the
program harmful.149 Some appear apathetic, noting that submitting
the fingerprints does not require any extra work on their part.150
This view, however, ignores the extra difficulty that officers face
because of uncooperative victims and witnesses.151 Other officers
insist that the program creates no community division because the
officers are not seeking out immigrants, and the only individuals
20110806.
144. See supra Part III.A.
145. See supra Parts I.C., III.A.
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
94 (2011) (showing a significant increase in the number of removals occurring in 2010 as
compared to 2007, before the implementation of Secure Communities). Admittedly, these
statistics do not account for increases in funding.
148. See supra Part I.C.
149. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, WHAT OTHERS ARE SAYING ... ABOUT
SECURE COMMUNITIES 1 (June 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/what-
others-say.pdf [hereinafter WHAT OTHERS ARE SAYING] (explaining that several law
enforcement organizations have issued statements in support of Secure Communities).
150. Id. at 2 (quoting Sgt. J.D. Nelson of Alameda County, California).
151. See supra Part III.A.
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fingerprinted are “criminals processed into our jail.”152 Regardless
of the perception of some law enforcement officials, the facts
show that many of the immigrants removed because of Secure
Communities have no criminal record.153 Some officials even argue
that Secure Communities “deters some illegal immigrants from
committing crimes.”154 The proponents of this argument, however,
have no ability to test the validity of their claim. The fact that police
may arrest fewer undocumented immigrants than before the
initiation of Secure Communities could mean that rather than there
being fewer immigrants committing crimes, there are simply fewer
immigrants reporting crimes.155
Despite the rising controversy around the program and several
jurisdictions announcing that they want nothing to do with it,156 ICE
has made it clear that it is expanding rather than reducing the
reach of the program.157 It also appears to have no sympathy for the
states and jurisdictions that have concerns about Secure Communi-
ties.158 Although using local law enforcement to collect data may be
very useful to ICE, it is very harmful to community policing. The
majority of law enforcement relies heavily on the cooperation of the
public in order to combat crime effectively. When that cooperation
ceases, so does the effectiveness of policing. 
152. WHAT OTHERS ARE SAYING, supra note 149, at 2 (quoting Lt. Basilio “Sonny” Cachuela,
Jr. of Fairfax County, Virginia). Note that in reality, 26 percent of immigrants deported from
Fairfax County, Virginia—where the quoted speaker is from—were noncriminals. ICE
STATISTICS, supra note 39, at 47. 
153. See supra Part I.C. 
154. WHAT OTHERS ARE SAYING, supra note 149, at 2 (quoting Sheriff Lee Baca of Los
Angeles, California).
155. See supra Part III.A. Additionally, any reduction in the number of immigrants
arrested and convicted of crimes could be the result of a reduction in the overall immigrant
population, related in large part to the recent economic downturn in the United States. See
DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & AARON TERRAZAS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRANTS AND
THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS 2-3, 9-10 (2009) (finding a leveling off of the immigrant
population in the United States since the recession and a correlation between economic
conditions and the population of undocumented immigrants).
156. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
158. Before signing a Memorandum of Agreement with ICE, officials from Colorado spent
months negotiating the terms of the agreement in order to ensure protection for victims of
domestic violence; when ICE unilaterally terminated all agreements, it voided those
protections. Bennett, supra note 143.
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A. Effective Coexistence Requires That Congress Modify Secure
Communities
In their current states, Secure Communities and the U Visa
cannot effectively coexist. The success of the U Visa legislation
depends on willing cooperation between local law enforcement and
immigrant communities. Immigrant victims stand to benefit from
the temporary legal status program only if they assist law enforce-
ment, and the U Visa only enhances law enforcement efforts if
officers can maintain the trust of the community. Secure Communi-
ties, on the other hand, relies on law enforcement arrests to locate
undocumented immigrants. Although on paper Secure Communities
appears to have little impact on the effectiveness of the U Visa, ICE
has implemented the program in a way that undercuts the U Visa’s
efforts to promote cooperation between immigrants and local law
enforcement.
The difficulty in finding a solution to these contradicting pro-
grams is that both programs serve different but equally important
interests: The U Visa promotes a humanitarian interest in protect-
ing victims, particularly those of domestic violence, and a commu-
nity safety interest in assisting local law enforcement. Secure
Communities’ contribution to community safety is in identifying
and removing dangerous criminal aliens. Because the programs
cannot coexist in their present state, one or both must be modified
or eliminated. The complete elimination of either one, however,
would be a drastic step that the government should take only if nec-
essary. Therefore, the best options are to modify the U Visa, modify
Secure Communities, or modify both. This Note advocates the slight
modification of Secure Communities in a way that alleviates the
tension between it and the U Visa so that both programs can pro-
mote the specific government interests they purport to advance. 
Secure Communities can serve a legitimate purpose, but its cur-
rent implementation reflects a goal of removing as many undocu-
mented immigrants as possible, notwithstanding that the majority
of the immigrants it places in removal proceedings pose no security
threat to the community.159 Worse yet, many of the aliens with Level
1 convictions are not removed. Since its implementation, Secure
Communities has identified approximately 239,592 aliens with
159. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
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Level 1 charges or convictions, but ultimately only 26 percent of
them were removed from the United States.160 To ensure that
Secure Communities serves its purported purpose of removing
serious criminals, ICE should be forced to wait until local police and
prosecutors have convicted someone of a Level 1 crime before re-
ceiving that individual’s fingerprints and checking his or her
immigration status. 
By focusing on convictions rather than arrests or charges, this
modification would ensure that those immigrants removed because
of Secure Communities are actually serious criminals. As a result,
ICE will be forced to use Secure Communities for the purpose for
which it was created, rather than as a mechanism to remove any
alien who comes into contact with the police. Even with this modi-
fication, ICE would still receive the benefit of assistance in locating
and detaining undocumented immigrants, as well as assistance in
prioritizing its limited resources. Additionally, the public and local
law enforcement would still receive the benefit that ICE’s apprehen-
sion and removal of serious criminals provides for overall commu-
nity safety, but would not suffer the consequences that the current
version of Secure Communities has produced. 
Reforming Secure Communities leaves unchanged ICE’s overall
authority to detain and remove undocumented immigrants. This
Note’s proposed modification is limited to the context of an immi-
grant’s interaction with local law enforcement. ICE retains the
ability to place any undocumented alien in removal proceedings,
regardless of criminal history. The modified version of Secure
Communities would protect an immigrant from placement in re-
moval proceedings as a result of relatively minor interactions with
the police. It does not issue a blanket protection to all noncriminal
undocumented immigrants who come into contact with ICE by other
means, including through employment or application for immigra-
tion benefits.
Most importantly, reforming Secure Communities would alleviate
the tension between it and the U Visa. This modification would
ensure that victims of crime—particularly those of domestic violence
who police often arrest as a matter of local procedure161 or by
160. See ICE STATISTICS, supra note 39, at 2. 
161. As discussed above, arresting both parties in a domestic violence situation is routine
practice in some jurisdictions. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
2082 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:2055
mistake—could report crimes and cooperate with the police without
fear that their involvement would place them in removal proceed-
ings. By eliminating that fear, this modification would also ensure
that local law enforcement officials have the opportunity to garner
trust among immigrant communities and effectively police them.
Ultimately, modifying Secure Communities would allow it to exist
concurrently with the U Visa without undermining its purpose. 
Procedurally, modifying Secure Communities would leave un-
changed the practice of releasing the fingerprints of arrestees to the
FBI to check for a criminal record. If an arrestee is found to have a
prior Level 1 conviction, ICE would receive his or her fingerprints
the same way it would for someone with a recent conviction.
However, if the arrestee does not have a past Level 1 conviction, the
FBI should release those fingerprints only in the event of a future
Level 1 conviction. By narrowly tailoring this modification, any
unnecessary burdens this change could inadvertently create would
be minimized.162 
Ideally, ICE would acquiesce to public concern about its imple-
mentation and use Secure Communities only for its purported pur-
pose, making modification unnecessary. Unfortunately, ICE has
made no indication it is willing to do so.163 As such, it is imperative
that Congress modify the program to prevent ICE’s abuse of it.
Although the current version of Secure Communities provides
benefits for ICE by assisting in the discovery and apprehension of
undocumented immigrants, it does so at the expense of local law
enforcement.164 By limiting the reach of Secure Communities to con-
victed criminal aliens, Congress would prevent the interests of ICE
from taking precedence over the interests of local jurisdictions.
B. Counterarguments
Supporters of Secure Communities may argue that its benefits
outweigh the interests promoted by the U Visa and that Congress
should modify or eliminate the U Visa and leave Secure Communi-
ties unaffected. Many supporters of Secure Communities believe
162. The question of whether this modification would significantly increase the burden
placed on the FBI is beyond the scope of this Note, but conceivably, the government could
create some form of alert system that would make any increase in burden negligible.
163. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part III.A-B.
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that undocumented immigrants increase crime rates and thus it is
beneficial to public safety to deport them.165 Studies on the relation-
ship between immigration and crime, however, often find no sub-
stantial connection to support this claim.166 With no evidence to
support the assertion that increasing removal efforts across the
board promotes public safety, one cannot reasonably determine that
the interests supported by Secure Communities outweigh those
supported by the U Visa. Arguing that Congress should eliminate
the U Visa altogether in favor of Secure Communities ignores the
legitimate government interest in protecting victims, particularly
those of domestic violence, and promoting cooperation with local law
enforcement. Though the humanitarian interest in protecting vic-
tims may prove unconvincing to some who place a higher value on
security, the community safety interest should be important to all
factions. A program that encourages all people within a community
to cooperate with the police makes it easier for law enforcement to
investigate crime and apprehend criminals: the fewer criminals that
remain at large, the safer the community. 
Even those who recognize the importance of the U Visa may still
support modifying it rather than making the proposed change to
Secure Communities. There is, however, no feasible way of changing
the U Visa while still supporting the government’s dual interests.
One of the major reasons the U Visa is not able to function effec-
tively is the chilling effect created by Secure Communities.167 The
only way to avoid that chilling effect is to eliminate the law enforce-
ment certificate requirement that verifies an immigrant’s helpful-
ness in a criminal investigation.168 This elimination, however, would
defeat Congress’s intent in creating the U Visa to not only protect
victims but also to promote cooperation with local law enforce-
ment.169 This Note’s goal is to formulate a solution that will allow
165. See, e.g., Max Fisher, Does Illegal Immigration Really Cause Crime?, ATLANTIC WIRE
(May 27, 2010), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2010/05/does-illegal-immigration-
really-cause-crime/24291/.
166. See, e.g., RUBEN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGR. POL’Y CENTER, THE MYTH
OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG
NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 1 (2007); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Crime,
Corrections, and California, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., Feb. 2008, at 1-2.
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. See supra Parts II.C., III.A. for a discussion on the requirement of a law enforcement
certification and the problems that occur when immigrants do not trust the police.
169. See supra Part II.A.
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both programs to function effectively, and modifying the U Visa in
this manner would fail to achieve that purpose. 
Opponents of Secure Communities may argue that the program
is unsalvageable and Congress should eliminate it: ICE should have
to use its own resources to identify and remove undocumented
immigrants. An argument based on this premise is also lacking
because it ignores the community and government’s interest in re-
moving serious criminal aliens from the United States.170 While ICE
could prioritize the removal of criminal aliens even in the absence
of Secure Communities, a system that automatically releases the
fingerprints of convicted criminals streamlines its efforts and in-
creases the likelihood of removing serious offenders. Additionally,
retaining the reformed version of Secure Communities should
appeal to even the most fervent of immigration advocates because
it ensures that most of ICE’s resources are focused on the removal
of criminal offenders. Absent Secure Communities, ICE would likely
continue to remove any undocumented immigrant whose informa-
tion is provided by law enforcement, regardless of criminal history. 
Ultimately, the only option that supports all of the government’s
interests and alleviates the tension between Secure Communities
and the U Visa is to modify Secure Communities. This is not to say
that this solution would satisfy all involved. Some may insist that
any solution that delays or reduces the removal of undocumented
immigrants is unacceptable, because enforcement of immigration
laws should be a top law enforcement priority. Even ICE, however,
admits that “[t]he highest priority of any law enforcement agency is
to protect the communities it serves.”171 Safety is, and should be, the
government’s priority, and in order to promote that priority, con-
cessions must be made. 
170. It is important to note, however, that studies have shown that undocumented
immigrants are no more likely to reoffend than other aliens. See Laura J. Hickman & Marika
J. Suttorp, Are Deportable Aliens a Unique Threat to Public Safety? Comparing the Recidivism
of Deportable and Nondeportable Aliens, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 59, 77 (2008).
Nonetheless, the goal of reducing recidivism in general could warrant the removal of criminal
aliens because it would at least reduce the number of individuals able to reoffend in the
United States.
171. Secure Communities, supra note 1.
2013] SECURE COMMUNITIES 2085
CONCLUSION
Isaura Garcia was one of the many casualties of Secure Commu-
nities. She was not a criminal, and yet she was the victim of a
program that purports to target only the most serious offenders.
Because of what happened to Isaura, the other immigrants in her
community may now think twice before calling the police. Other
victims of domestic violence may decide it is better to suffer abuse
than to face deportation. Whereas Isaura and other victims could
have benefited from the U Visa, they never will if they are too afraid
to report crimes. The police could arrest and convict violent criminal
abusers, but they never will if the victims and witnesses of the
crime refuse to speak out for fear of deportation. 
Under the reformed version of Secure Communities, Isaura would
not have ended up in removal proceedings as a result of calling the
police.172 She could have cooperated with law enforcement and, if
convicted, ICE would have received her abuser’s fingerprints and
placed him in removal proceedings. Isaura could then have returned
to her community and told them about how helpful the local police
had been. Her positive experience may have encouraged other vic-
tims of crime to call the police, possibly allowing the police to arrest
and convict more serious criminals who ICE could subsequently
remove from the United States. Under this reformed version of
Secure Communities, victims will no longer need to fear interactions
with local law enforcement, and increased cooperation sparked by
the U Visa will create a much safer society for all. 
Lindsey J. Gill*
172. After an outpouring of support by immigration and civil rights advocates on behalf of
Isaura Garcia, ICE finally terminated removal proceedings against her. See Matt Coker,
Isaura Garcia, Battered Woman Facing Deportation, Embodies Problems with ICE Program,
OCWEEKLY (May 13, 2011, 5:26 PM), http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazing/2011/05/isaura_
garcia_battered_secure.php. Unfortunately, there are many like her for whom this has not
been the case.
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